UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE: . Case No. 09-50026-mq

MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, . Chapter 11

et al., f/k/a GENERAL

MOTORS CORP., et al, . (Jointly administered)

Debtors.

. MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY . Adv. Proc. No. 09-00504-mg

AVOIDANCE ACTION TRUST, by and . through the Wilmington Trust Company, solely in its capacity . as Trust Administrator and Trustee,

Plaintiff,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

individually and as

Administrative Agent for .

Various lenders party to the . One Bowling Green Term Loan Agreement described . New York, NY 10004

herein, et al.,

. Friday, April 7, 2017

. 10:04 a.m. Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDING: 09-00504-mg MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY AVOIDANCE ACTION TRUST V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ET AL, (CC: DOC. NO. DOC# 895) PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE;

(CC: DOC. NO. DOC# 864, 865, 866, 867, 893, 894) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF JAMES M. MAROUARDT; (CONTINUED)

> BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARTIN GLENN UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES CONTINUED

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TRANSCRIPT OF: (CONTINUED)

ADVERSARY PROCEEDING: 09-00504-mg MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY AVOIDANCE ACTION TRUST V. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ET AL (CC: DOC# 869) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF ABDUL LAKHANI; (CC: DOC# 868) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE NON-PARTY RULE 30(B)(6) TESTIMONY OF KPMG AND DELOITTE; (CC: DOC# 870) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF GLENN HUBBARD; (CC: DOC# 872) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE KPMG REPORT AND ITS SCHEDULES AND WORK PAPERS; (CC: DOC# 871) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT REPORTS AND TESTIMONY OF MARYANN KELLER; (CC: DOC# 874) MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT REPORTS AND TESTIMONY OF FORMER GM EMPLOYEES; (CC: DOC# 873, 875) MOTION TO ALLOW/NOTICE OF THE TERM LENDERS MOTION IN LIMINE

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(Proceedings commence at 10:04 a.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

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THE COURT: Please be seated. We're here in Motors Liquidation Company Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al. It's adversary proceeding 09-00504. Good morning, everyone.

MR. FISHER: Good morning, Your Honor.

MR. WOLINSKY: Morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. We're here for the final pretrial 10 conference -- hopefully, final pretrial conference. All right. So first, with respect to the motions in limine, the orders $12 \parallel \text{probably will be filed shortly after the hearing today.}$ One is 13 still being played with. The result is clear, though, on it. So let me go through these very briefly. I always try to 15 decide motions in limine in advance of trial so everybody knows 16 what they have to do to prepare. They're being done in order. Some of them, you know, are five, six, seven pages, some are $18 \parallel$ shorter. All right. I just -- this is no particular order, 19 just what I have them stacked in right now.

It's the plaintiff's motion in limine to exclude expert reports and testimony of former GM employees. It was ECF Docket Number 874. The motion is being denied in part and granted in part. The order will speak for itself, but just to 24 briefly summarize.

First, the Court concluded that the former GM

1 employees are qualified to serve as experts under Rule 702. 2 Second, concludes that the designated former GM employees' 3 reports are not inadmissible hearsay. Next, the designated GM 4 experts may testify about objective indicators of intent, but 5 not Old GM's subjective intent. Next, Buttermore may opine on 6 GM MFD-Pontiac and GM Powertrain Engineering-Pontiac. that's just a real quick capsule. The order will get filed shortly after the hearing.

The next one I just have in my stack is the term 10 | lenders' motion in limine. It's ECF Docket Number 873. Request to exclude the testimony and expert report of Mulhagen 12 (phonetic), exclude certain new opinions from David Gosling (phonetic), prevent the avoidance trust from present parol evidence regarding the meaning of the terms "fixture" and "collateral." I'm going to reserve decision with respect to Gosling. His new opinions, they didn't seem all that exciting to me, frankly, but I'll decide after hearing other direct and 18 cross-examination of the witness.

With respect to Mulhagen, Court is excluding 20 Mulhagen's testimony. Mulhagen's only claimed expertise is in real estate generally. His testimony simply regurgitates the 22 First American title search and does nothing to help this Court as the trier of fact. Because Mulhagen did not perform any of 24 \parallel the title searches, much less that he's not an expert in title searches, the Court finds that his testimony would not be

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1 relevant in assisting its determination of whether the title 2 report would put a purchaser on notice of reported liens on 3 fixtures at the Lansing plants.

With respect to parol evidence, the Court concludes 5 that the terms "fixture" and "collateral" are clear on their $6\parallel$ face and can be defined according to a legal dictionary. the extent that a scrivener's error might render the contract 8 hypothetically ambiguous, the parties have stipulated to the correction of that error. Therefore, parol evidence on the meaning and interpretation of the term loan agreements is inappropriate and will be excluded at trial. The order 12 elaborates on what I just described.

Next is the motion in limine to exclude the expert report and testimony of James Marquardt. Motion is granted in part and denied in part. Court concludes that Marquardt is qualified as an expert to offer testimony about whether the Eaton County fixture filing would have been identified for inclusion by a real property searcher searching for liens or 19 encumbrances against Lansing plants.

Marquardt's report offers two opinions. The first opinion is an opinion that could not and -- the first opinion -- how did I describe that as -- bear with me -- first opinion is that a title search he conducted at the Eaton County 24 Register of Deeds would have identified the Eaton County 25∥ fixture filing and put a potential purchaser or lender on

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1 notice of a lien against the fixtures at the Lansing plants. 2 His second opinion was that the GM facilities known as 3 MFD-Pontiac and Powertrain Engineering-Pontiac were related as 4 they were situated upon the land that was identified by a 5 single tax parcel number and transferred three times using a 6 single deed of conveyance in each instance.

The first opinion that a title search he conducted at the Eaton County Register of Deeds would have identified the Eaton County fixture filing and put a potential purchaser or lender on notice, I conclude that that is an admissible It plainly meets the standard for expert testimony. The Court finds that the first opinion relying on a title search that Marquardt performed himself is relevant and sufficiently describes the process. It elaborates further. Marquardt cannot testify to the standard required under Michigan law, but he can offer relevant testimony whether a secured lender or purchaser would be on notice that the $18 \parallel \text{fixtures}$ in the Lansing plants were encumbered by a lien.

The Court will permit Marquardt's second opinion, but only in part. Marquadt may offer opinion testimony that GM's facilities known as MFD-Pontiac and Powertrain Engineering Pontiac are situated upon land identified by a single parcel number and were transferred three times using a single deed of conveyance in each instance, but the portion of Marquardt's second opinion that concludes that the facilities were related

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will be excluded. Whether the facilities are related in a $2 \parallel \text{legal sense}$ requires the Court to reach a legal conclusion that the Court is capable of deciding for itself. The term loan 4 lenders failed to meet their burden of showing why this 5 conclusion is beyond the ability of a non-expert to reach.

Next is the trust's motion to exclude either portions or the entirety of the non-party Rule 30(b)(6) witness testimony from Patrick Furey and Kevin Voigt from KPMG and Richard Starzecki from Deloitte. The Court's order will grant the motion in part and deny it in part. Each of the witnesses has a different level of personal knowledge regarding the facts 12 underlying their testimony.

Furey managed and oversaw important elements of the KPMG report and could have valuable information relating to his involvement in the process. Additionally, Furey is knowledgeable on the policies and processes that went into the report, along with more general matters. While Furey may -- he 18 may have testified in his deposition about things he learned 19 through speaking with others at KPMG after the fact in preparation for his deposition, foreclosing entire portions of his testimony at this juncture would be premature. have the deposition, so I haven't been able to see what he's testified. So at least for now, the Furey motion is denied.

As to Voigt, he did not participate in the 25 fresh-start accounting process, did not assist in any way in 1 the preparation of the KPMG report, and did not even discuss 2 \parallel the report with anyone at KPMG. Any testimony he would offer 3 would not arise from any work he did in contributing to or 4 assisting with, managing, overseeing, or participating in its $5 \parallel \text{preparation}$. While he may have knowledge of KPMG's practices and policies, Voigt has not been designated as an expert witness, and his fact testimony would all be -- is either hearsay or not relevant on the valuation issues. So with respect to Voigt, his testimony will be excluded.

As to Starzecki, like Furey, he was deeply involved 11 in the fresh-start accounting processes at KPMG while it was 12 | taking place and was personally involved in Deloitte's audit process. While he may have spoken with others at Deloitte in preparation for his deposition, he certainly has firsthand, direct personal knowledge regarding Deloitte's audit and the fresh-start accounting work performed by Deloitte on this engagement and other relevant aspects of the valuation work in this case. Accordingly, it would be premature to foreclosure entire portions of Starzecki's testimony at this time. there are objections during his testimony, I'll certainly hear it.

The last order that'll be entered is denying 23 plaintiff's motion to exclude the KPMG report and testimony of Maryann Keller, Glenn Hubbard, and Abdul Lakhani. I want to make clear that I have some real problems about the KPMG

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1 fresh-start accounting report, and what I'm saying now is not 2 necessarily going to be expressed directly in the order that $3 \parallel \text{it's going to be in.}$ I want to make clear to everybody I have 4 some real reservations about the relevance of the KPMG 5 fresh-start accounting for the issues that'll have to be 6 decided at this trial. They did not do an asset-by-asset valuation. I'm dealing here with determining whether 40 representative assets are fixtures, and if so, how they should be valued.

I also think that the defendants are cherry-picking 11 from the KPMG report. They like part of it and totally dislike another part of it. So most of the testimony they're going to offer really is to show what KPMG got wrong. Well, we'll see. So I'm denying the motion in limine. I want to hear the testimony, but I've got some real reservations about it.

So that's the ruling on the motions in limine. as I said, the orders will be entered sometime this morning.

So I've reviewed the joint pretrial order, and I'll 19 hear from both sides about it. I'll just make some preliminary 20 comments now.

I guess from a procedural standpoint, the parties $22\parallel$ have agreed to deviate, at least in part, from the normal order of presentation at trial. At page 24 of the joint pretrial order, it provides that the parties have agreed that defendants shall present their witnesses first, goes on to the extent that

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1 if the plaintiff is calling a witness the defendants are also $2 \parallel$ calling, plaintiff shall take its direct testimony of that 3 witness immediately following or as part of its 4 cross-examination.

I'm satisfied with deviating from the normal. 6 parties have agreed to do that. I think it makes some sense in the context of the case. And we'll just see -- and I think --8 you reflected -- I think I probably said it at an earlier point. I typically only want to hear witnesses once if possible, so I don't sustain objections to beyond the scope. If the defendants call witnesses first and Mr. Fisher wants to 12 -- he should do his full examination of them when they're 13 called. So that's fine.

And I see that parties have agreed not to present opening statements. That's fine with me. I've already read the trial briefs and I had some comments and questions when we get through this, based on reading the trial briefs.

I guess where the parties seem to disagree is whether 19 I'll first hear witnesses on what's a fixture and then issues 20 on valuation. I want to hear the parties on that. I guess my initial reaction was -- I'm not bifurcating, but I'm also willing to provide some flexibility on the order of 23 presentation, but I do want to hear -- that seems to be an area 24 of disagreement between the parties, and I do want to hear from 25 them on it.

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I guess one -- and I got, I guess from Wachtell, a $2 \parallel$ corrected Exhibit C in the -- to the pretrial order. I have 3 that with me. I have a -- you know, from the descriptions of 4 the exhibits, I really don't know what's what. I have one 5 observation. I mean, you've got a lot of witnesses designated. 6 I don't know. And I think one thing you really do need to address for me is how long you really -- if you've talked about how long you think this trial is going to last because you've got a lot of witnesses.

Mr. Fisher, let me hear from you first.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, Eric Fisher from Binder & 12 Schwartz on behalf of the plaintiff. Let me begin by just addressing the bifurcation question that Your Honor raised. So to begin with, of course, you noted that defendants will be presenting their evidence first, and that is because we have agreed, also reflected in the joint pretrial order, that the defendants bear the burden in this case, although there is a remaining dispute as to whether -- who bears the burden with 19 respect to the Lansing fixture filing issue.

In terms of bifurcation, our view is that we don't see the efficiencies to be gained by that. Defendants bearing the burden should go first and should present the entirety of their case, and then we should have the opportunity to respond to the entirety of their case. And more specifically, I think at least the way we think about our case presentation, we think 1 that that would be hampered in some way by bifurcation. As the 2 Court is aware, we have a single expert witness, Mr. Gosling, 3 who addresses both fixture classification and valuation issues, 4 and there are areas of overlap.

To provide just a few very quick examples, the $6\parallel$ question of whether or not there was a secondary market for the sale of some of these assets for reuse is important to 8 Mr. Gosling's opinion, both in terms of how it weighs in his opinion about how the assets ought to be classified, but also, 10 of course, in terms of looking for market comparables, which bears on his valuation opinion. Similarly, the question of 12 what's the useful life of some of these assets is relevant, 13 both to the questions of was there intent for the asset to be permanently installed and is also important to the rate at which the asset is depreciated for valuation purposes. Industry trends, market data, those -- that kind of information provides the backdrop for both some of his classification 18 opinions and also his valuation opinions.

So we're opposed to bifurcating. The issue was 20 raised casually to us weeks ago as something that the defendants were thinking about, and it was only on March 30th, I think -- or I'm sorry, March 29th, two days before the joint pretrial order was due, that the defendants told us that this is something they want to do, and that's why -- that's how that dispute came to be reflected in the joint pretrial order.

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So that's our position on bifurcation. I don't know 1 2 if Your Honor wants to hear from the defendants on --3 THE COURT: I do. Let me hear from the other side on 4 that. 5 MR. FISHER: Okay. 6 MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor, Marc Wolinsky. On bifurcation, the thought was simply it would be better for you. 8 If it's not better for you, then we're not pushing the issue. 9 THE COURT: I don't think it's better for me. MR. WOLINSKY: Then so be it. 10 Okay. We've got that resolved. 11 THE COURT: 12 MR. WOLINSKY: Okay. 13 THE COURT: Let me -- I left some notes inside. Thought I was all organized and everything. Just let me go get my notes. Everybody stay seated while I come back in. Okay? (Pause) Okay. What I wanted to raise and -- you know, I got Mr. Wolinsky's April 6th letter about wanting to add the 18∥ witness. In fact, it raised an issue which I was going to --19 already going to raise today. 20 So obviously, we're doing a trial with respect to 40 21 so-called representative assets with 199,960, at least, in 22 \parallel reserve. And so from the start, I viewed -- the goal of this exercise, and I think it's reflected in your pretrial order, is 24 to try and provide greater guidance, obviously deciding not

25 \parallel advisory opinions, but specifically as to the 40 representative

assets.

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So ordinarily, I don't go looking for issues that the 3 parties haven't identified in their pretrial papers. And as I 4 said, I read the briefs, read the pretrial order, read motions $5\parallel$ in limine. And it may be that I'm -- have the wrong questions 6 in mind on some issues, but let me put it this way. Let me find in my notes specifically what I was looking for.

Okay. So the issue that I had given some thought about and which maybe Mr. Wolinsky's letter was aiming at something else, but I started with this proposition. Michigan cases, I think the Ohio cases make clear that if it's a fixture, it becomes part of the real property. And it raised the question in my mind, who owns the real property? Who owns the equipment? Is it the same party? I haven't read every case you've cited in your briefs, but I've read a lot of them already, and I didn't find any cases that dealt with an issue about where the equipment was owned by one entity and the real estate by another entity. Maybe I missed the case, 19 Mr. Wolinsky. Okay.

So you're raising the issue and you want to offer -you want to add a witness who's going to testify about ownership of property. But in your brief -- and this is, in part, what triggered my question. So, you know, I wrote a question to myself, which entity purchased each of the 25∥ representative assets? Does each of those entities still

1 reflect ownership of the representative assets in its books and 2 records, I quess as of the date of the transaction? Does the 3 ownership of each of the representative assets coincide with 4 the ownership of each of the real properties where the 5 representative assets are located?

In connection with another argument made by the defendants in their brief at page 75, the brief states that, quote:

> "On each of three separate occasions between July 26th, 2000 and March 23, 2007, title to the entire parcel covering both facilities was transferred from one Old GM affiliate to another. Each time, a single deed of conveyance transferred title to all of the land where both MFD-Pontiac and Powertrain Engineering-Pontiac are located."

And that certain suggested that ownership of GM properties was held in different names at different times. 18 so it raised the questions in my mind, how was title to the 19 alleged fixtures reflected in the books and records? Was title 20 to the fixtures transferred when property was transferred? Did the deeds also report to transfer ownership of fixtures? 22 \parallel the books and records show that different entities owned the 23 real property on the one hand and the alleged fixtures on the 24 other hand, do such facts rebut any argument that GM intended 25 for the property to become fixtures?

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So your letter suggested, Mr. Wolinsky, that 2 everything was owned by General Motors Corporation but your 3 brief, at last at the one reference that I've quoted to you 4 from page 75, suggested otherwise. And I didn't -- maybe I $5 \parallel$ missed it. I didn't see anything in either side's trial briefs 6 that addressed the issue. I didn't see anything in the pretrial order that addressed the issue. I had intended to raise it even if I hadn't received your letter. Ordinarily, I'd just let, you know, the parties tell me what the issues are 10 and what their witnesses are and go forward and, you know, if 11 \parallel it results in a failure of proof, well, that's tough luck, I 12 guess. But there's another 199,000-plus assets. And I don't 13 -- I just may be totally off-base, and when I first thought about the issue, I thought, well, maybe I'm wrong, but then I got to page 75 of your brief. That only addressed one 16 property. I don't know whether the same issue arises with respect to multiple properties.

So at a couple of places -- and let me say, I really 19 found the site visit earlier this week to be very valuable, and I appreciated the opportunity to be able to see it. It was very well organized by -- and I commend both sides -- all sides. I guess it was more than two, but -- for making the arrangements, and I found it very useful.

In the -- I mean, the descriptions of the 25∥ representative assets that were viewed included the reference 1 to what the original cost was for each of them and when it was $2 \parallel$ put in service. There were a few assets that moved, and they 3 were identified. And so when an asset is moved, was it a $4 \parallel$ fixture where it came from? Does it become a fixture when it 5 moves?

One other thing I noted from your pretrial order, the Delaware UCC-1 had a -- at page 9 of the pretrial order at paragraph 48, a UCC-1 financing was filed with the Secretary of State of Delaware, which perfected the term lenders' security interest in all collateral, quote, "now owned or any hereafter acquired, " closed quote. Well, I've seen after-acquired property clauses. But when you talk about the fixture filings, 13 you don't reference any after-acquired property clauses. Whether that was an oversight or not, I don't know, but when I get to page 11 of the pretrial order, the Eaton County fixture filing, you quote, "All fixtures" -- a quote from paragraph 61, quote, "all fixtures located on the real estate described in 18 Exhibit A."

So because assets moved, for fixture purposes, if 20 there's no after-acquired clause in the fixture filing -- well, if the fixture filing was done when the original loan was granted, then you moved more equipment to the site, I don't -you know, you're going to have to convince me that somehow it became a fixture despite the fact that there's no after-acquired fixture -- property clause. And I guess what

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1 I'm describing, these things sort of, in my view, link 2 together. It may be that was just an oversight, that there is 3 an after-acquired property clause in the fixture filings, I 4 don't know, but the least -- you made a point of referencing it $5\parallel$ when you dealt with the UCC-1 in Delaware, but did not when you 6 dealt with the fixture filings. And I don't know whether all -- whether some fixture filings included after-property -after-acquired property clauses and some didn't. I don't know.

I don't know whether you've done discovery with 10 \parallel respect to who owns what, is there common ownership of both -you know, if, for example, the -- during the site visit, I didn't bring that out, but the sheets that you gave me describing the assets that we were going to be viewing, they were -- I saw at least references to two different types of fixed asset ledgers, one an e-filed ledger and one other -- I forget what it was called, but a different ledger. So I know that any large company keeps books and records of what property it owns, equipment, machinery, these -- you know, these are 19 | expensive machines, right? And I don't know what -- I don't know whether you've marked -- I assume you've marked these ledgers as exhibits. I don't know. I can't discern it from the exhibit list. And I don't know whether those ledgers reflect which corporate entity owned what asset, when they were acquired. Some of them were, you know, I mean, multimillion-dollar pieces of equipment. I don't know who

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1 owned them. And maybe you'll find -- maybe there are cases I $2 \parallel$ just didn't read yet. I didn't read every case you've cited, 3 but I read a lot of the cases of -- mostly Michigan cases at 4 this point since we're going to Michigan, but I read some of 5 the Ohio cases, as well.

So that's an issue I wanted to raise because it does seem to me -- I let you try your own case, but then if this becomes, you know, the other 199,000-plus of assets, this could be very relevant. It seems I may have the wrong analysis of it, but, you know, when I read the cases and they say if you get -- if you buy equipment and you install it and you satisfy 12 the three tests, it becomes part of the real property. Well, does that mean title shifts and if, for example, a different GM entity acquired it and continued to reflect that entity as owning the asset on its books and records at the time of the bankruptcy, that could very well indicate there was no intent to have it become a fixture. Let me stop there. I don't know. Any of you can address that. It wasn't -- I know it wasn't on 19 your plans to talk about today, but --

MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor, Marc Wolinsky. You're right. It's not an issue the parties focused on because I think, frankly, it's a non-issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Tell me why.

MR. WOLINSKY: Non-issue because the grand tour of 25 \parallel the security interest with General Motors Corporation. General

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1 Motors Corporation had the power to grant the term lenders the 2 security interest in all of the fixtures that it owned 3 regardless of what legal entity below General Motors.

THE COURT: Where do you draw that from?

MR. WOLINSKY: Excuse me? Where did I draw that

from?

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THE COURT: Where do you -- yeah.

MR. WOLINSKY: I think it's kind of basic.

THE COURT: Is it?

MR. WOLINSKY: General Motors has the power and 11 represented to the term lenders in the collateral agreement.

THE COURT: You think that if XYZ subsidiary 13 continued to reflect the asset on its books and records as $14 \parallel$ being owned by it that the fact that GM may have had the power 15∥ to grant it, but if up until the time of the bankruptcy, a 16 particular affiliate recorded it as its property, you think 17∥ that would be trumped by -- I have to be careful about using 18 that term -- that it would -- you know, that it -- the fact 19 that GM may have had the power, there would be an argument 20 whether it exercised the power.

MR. WOLINSKY: Again, I think that's covered by the 22 \parallel contract. I could go back -- obviously, I didn't reread the collateral agreement, but GM, in the collateral agreement, 24 represented that it had the power, granted the security interests, expressed no limitations. The fixture filings

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1 themselves are made by General Motors Corporation.
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             THE COURT: Is there an after-acquired property
3 clause in the fixture filings?
             MR. WOLINSKY: No. And that -- there's not.
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                                                            And
5 that raises -- you know, it's an interesting question.
 6\parallel something was moved in or out after June 1 -- after the date of
   the fixture filing, it will be an interest question.
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   Ultimately, though, you know our position. Things don't move.
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             THE COURT: Well, but you -- even with the
10 representative assets we looked at --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Yes.
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             THE COURT: -- there were things that moved.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: There were things -- that's something
   that we actually haven't gotten into. The -- as you know,
   there were 20 and 20 from each side.
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             THE COURT: Yes.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: We didn't delineate for you, Your
18 Honor, who picked which --
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             THE COURT: Yeah.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: -- but there's a reason why you saw
   some assets that were moved, because that's the plaintiff's
22\parallel theory, things moved. We picked things that hadn't moved. If
   you look at -- when you hear the evidence at trial, you'll see
24\parallel that the incidence of assets moving is infinitesimal, but the
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25∥ kinds of assets that we saw almost never. So movement is a

1 nice theoretical issue in the framework in which Your Honor has 2 posited, but in terms of deciding the other 199,000, it's not $3 \parallel$ going to be a substantive issue, at least from our perspective.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. WOLINSKY: It goes to the issue, from the 6 plaintiff's perspective, of whether things are a fixture if they can be moved, but it doesn't go -- it will not disrupt the ability to take Your Honor's ruling and apply it to the other 199,000. And going back to the original point that you raised, 10 no party focused on this issue, no party raised this issue, and there's a reason, and I think the reason is because General Motors represented and did exercise -- represented that it had 13 the power --

> THE COURT: The --

MR. WOLINSKY: -- and exercised the power to grant security interest in all of its collateral.

THE COURT: The fixture filings don't define what's include. It's just -- it's, you know, all fixtures. 19∥ that's good. We'll figure out what the fixtures are.

MR. WOLINSKY: Yes. So what's wrong with that? That's commercially practical --

THE COURT: Fixtures, the intent of having it 23 permanent is a required element of that.

24 MR. WOLINSKY: Intent at the time of installation, 25∥ yes.

1 THE COURT: Yes, correct. 2 MR. WOLINSKY: And permanent obviously --3 THE COURT: Well, we'll see. I raise the issue --4 MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah. THE COURT: I was -- particularly when I saw page 75 5 6 of your brief that reflected how many times title changed on 7 property. 8 MR. WOLINSKY: Title changed for the property. The 9 fixtures -- unless separately, fixtures can be disassociated from the property by contract. That happens. But unless there's a separate provision in the contract disassociating the 12 fixtures from the property --13 THE COURT: Was there any requirement in the contract 14 that GM had to give notice to the lenders before it disposed of any of the -- some of the equipment is multimillion dollars, so 16 17 MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah. 18 THE COURT: I mean, look, frankly, what -- it made 19∥perfectly good sense. It looks like that JPMorgan used a belt and suspenders approach to its security interest, okay. The UCC-1 in Delaware, I saw it quoted --22 MR. WOLINSKY: Right. 23 THE COURT: -- says fixtures. Okay. And then, you 24 know, the contract provided that you would file in the counties

-- fixture filings in the counties where major assets were, and

it made perfect sense. The only problem is the belt broke, and 2 now the question is do the suspenders hold it up. 3 MR. WOLINSKY: Right. 4 THE COURT: And so it wasn't important at the time $5\parallel$ that the agreement was written and signed as to what was a $6\parallel$ fixture and what was not because you had it covered either way, at least as to the 26 places where there were fixture filings, 8 but now it's an issue. I'm sorry, you were going to say 9 something. 10 MR. WOLINSKY: No, no, I wasn't. I'm listening.

> THE COURT: Did GM have --

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MR. FISHER: My understanding --

MR. NOVIKOFF: Yeah, okay.

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead. Did GM have to give 15∥ notice to the lenders before it disposed of equipment?

MR. WOLINSKY: Let me look that -- one of my colleagues can look that up.

THE COURT: Okay. Sure. All right.

MR. WOLINSKY: Let me just -- someone hand --20 Mr. Novikoff handed up to me the rep and warranty in the collateral --

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WOLINSKY: -- collateral agreement. This is a 24 rep and warranty by General Motors Corporation, the ultimate parent, section 3.01. So GM represented to the term lenders

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1 the collaterals owned by such grantor free and clear of any
 2 lien, such grantor, A, is the record and beneficial owner of
 3 the collateral pledged by it pursuant to this agreement; and B,
 4 has rights in and title to the collateral owned by it and has
 5 \parallel full power and authority to grant to the agent the security
 6 interest granted herein.
 7
             THE COURT: Well, we'll find out whether they were
 8
   record and beneficial owner. I may -- you know, I don't know.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor, I think for these
10 purposes, it doesn't matter.
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             THE COURT: It's boiler -- well --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: No, I really --
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             THE COURT: -- maybe it does and maybe it doesn't.
14 We'll see.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Well, okay.
             THE COURT: Let me ask you another question.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.
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             THE COURT: Were there mortgages on the real property
19 and who held them?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: By and large, not. No, this was done
   to -- there were no mortgages, and the reason why they did it
   the way they did it is because GM didn't want mortgages. They
   were -- it was a machinery and equipment loan, so there were no
   mortgages. I think Saturn may have had a mortgage, but not
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25 meaningful here.

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THE COURT: All right. Well --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: To answer your other question --
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             THE COURT: -- maybe wrong place.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor had a question. I think
 5\parallel there just was one ledger, the eFast ledger. That's the --
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             THE COURT: What you gave out to me in Michigan had
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  references to two different ledgers.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: If it did, it was mistaken. There is
   only one ledger, one official asset ledger at General Motors,
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  the eFast ledger.
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             THE COURT:
                         Is that an exhibit?
             MR. WOLINSKY: It was maintained by Old GM, taken
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13 over by New GM.
             THE COURT:
                         Is that an exhibit?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Yes, it is. It -- well, the whole
16 thing is like this, so we gave you the relevant parts.
17
             One other thing Your Honor said, you know, is -- you
18 \parallel made the observation, was it a fixture when it was put in and
19 was it a fixture when it was moved to the new location. And
   the answer is yes because all -- if you go back to the basic
   issue of property law, a fixture is -- starts its life as
   personal property. The stamping machine that we saw in --
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             THE COURT: Warren?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: No, the stamping machine in Lansing
25∥ was created in Germany. When it was on the boat, coming
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across, coming down the St. Lawrence to Michigan and offloaded $2 \parallel$ on the boat, it was personal property up until the time it was installed. 3 THE COURT: Yes. But --4 5 MR. WOLINSKY: If it was de-installed, it loses its character as personal property --6 7 THE COURT: And --8 MR. WOLINSKY: -- but then it's reinstalled, which it 9 doesn't really happen --10 THE COURT: Well, so one of the assets we saw was moved from Canada. I don't remember which one. 11 MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah, the Liebherr hob St. Catharine's 12 13 was installed in Canada, a fixture in Canada, at least in our world, moved to Lansing --15 THE COURT: But does the -- it's a fixture in your 16 world, but was there a fixture filing in Canada? 17 MR. WOLINSKY: No, probably not. It was a U.S. loan. 18 THE COURT: Okay. MR. WOLINSKY: This loan was the U.S. loan. 19 20 THE COURT: Then why was it a fixture in Canada if --21 MR. WOLINSKY: We're getting into the date issue, so that's the issue Your Honor's pointing to. When was it moved into place and was it in place in Lansing on the date of grant? Off the top of my head, I don't know that. Yeah. 24

THE COURT: I don't remember either. I didn't bring

1 out papers.

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MR. WOLINSKY: But if it wasn't, fine, you know, $3 \parallel$ maybe we lose that one asset, but for purposes of the 4 representative asset trial, again, I don't think that's going 5 to affect the utility of exercise. Because as I started 6 alluding to, the plaintiff , for their reasons, picked, in our view, idiosyncratic assets to make a point, but they picked 8 idiosyncratic assets. We saw the Liebherr hob machine, that's one of probably 3- or 400 milling machines that we saw in 10∥Warren. They picked the one that moved from Canada, so they're going to point to the one and we're going to point to the 12 299 --

THE COURT: Well, I think somebody pointed to another 14 one on the floor that was like it, but --

MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah, yes, we -- yeah. So they're 16 going to point to the one, we're going to point to the 299, and we're going to say the exception proves the rule, and they're 18 going to say the exception is the rule. And that's really a 19 big part of what the trial's going to be about.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fisher.

MR. FISHER: Eric Fisher. Your Honor, on the 22 \parallel ownership issue, we did take discovery that we thought was relevant to the ownership issues that were of concern to the 24 plaintiffs. So, for example, we sought and obtained and marked as exhibits all kinds of tax information from GM, including,

1 importantly for our purposes, personal property tax returns, 2 indicating whether the representative assets were classified as 3 personal property. We took discovery of leases. Some of the 4 | largest presses at issue were leased assets, and according to $5\parallel$ the terms of the lease, GM was not permitted to convert these 6 presses into fixtures, and they had to retain the characteristics of personal property. So Your Honor has raised --THE COURT: Who owned the assets? MR. FISHER: Not GM in those instances under the lease. THE COURT: Not the lease situation. You said that 13 you took discovery of -- what was that term? MR. FISHER: Of the personal property tax returns, 15 Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. MR. FISHER: It was the General Motors entity filing 18 the return, in those instances, that owned the property 19 indicated on the return. This issue of ownership, though, as it came up literally yesterday -- and that gets to the issue, I think, about the belated designation of this additional 22 \parallel witness. There was no discovery about the question that Mr. Wolinsky raised with me yesterday concerning ownership of

24 the different plants. And the only discovery that I'm aware of

25∥ that the defendant sought on that topic is they sent us

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1 requests for admission back in February, asking us to concede 2 ownership questions related to the specific facilities, and we 3 denied their request for admission on the grounds that we don't $4 \parallel \text{know}$. And as Your Honor has indicated, it can be a fairly 5 complicated question in terms of exactly which entity owned 6 which plant and under what terms. And the reality is that there has been no discovery on that.

THE COURT: Well, then, as I said, I pointed at page 75 of the brief, which was the only place I saw any reference to -- talk about seven transfers, but very relevant property 11 we've got a big dispute about. Do you agree with Mr. Wolinsky 12 \parallel that the issue of which entity owned the property is not 13 relevant to whether the term lenders have a security agreement in equipment that's determined to be a fixture?

MR. FISHER: I think that the ownership issue very 16 well may be relevant to that question, Your Honor. And it's -again, I think, this gets --

THE COURT: You're only saying that because I raised 19 the question.

MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.

MR. FISHER: No, I -- so to be absolutely --

THE COURT: I could be way off base on this. 23 not focused -- I don't have the underlying documents yet, so I wasn't able to look at the --

MR. FISHER: So to be absolutely forthright, it has

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1 -- it's always been my understanding in trying to guess why 2 this ownership issue was important to the defendants that what they were trying to do is support this presumption that you find in --

THE COURT: Sure.

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MR. FISHER: -- certain trial court cases. I don't think there's any controlling authority, and I don't think this presumption's consistently applied, but there are cases that refer to a presumption that when an owner installs equipment, there's a presumption of fixture status that that needs to be rebutted. That's always been my understanding of why they're 12 \parallel seeking this ownership information. I frankly had not -- have 13 not given sufficient attention to the question that Your Honor raised this morning and the other way in which the ownership question could affect important issues in the case. there's been no discovery on that.

THE COURT: Did General Motors Corporation own the 18 | land and buildings where the 40 representative assets were 19 located?

MR. FISHER: I am not certain. I cannot stipulate to that. The defendants seem quite certain of it, and I'm happy to continue to discuss this with them. If the proof is overwhelming, then I suppose we'll agree. Or if the proof is overwhelming, they can put it on and prove it.

THE COURT: How many witnesses do you want to depose,

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Mr. Wolinsky? There going to be a 30 -- because you wanted to
 2 take another deposition.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Oh, no, Your Honor, you misread.
             THE COURT: I misread?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah, no, we --
             THE COURT: I thought if they weren't willing to
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   stipulate, you wanted --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: They were willing -- they're not
  willing to stipulate -- the eFast ledger, turns out, has a
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10\parallel field in it which designates who the owner of the land is.
   Surprise, surprise, General Motors is the owner of the land.
   So, you know, we're going to call Colleen Charles --
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             THE COURT: Well, if the eCast [sic] ledger is
14 correct about it. I don't know, they may just put --
             MR. WOLINSKY: But --
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             THE COURT: Did it say General Motors Corporation or
   did it say just General Motors?
             MR. WOLINSKY: I --
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             THE COURT: It could be a -- just a generic term
20 for --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: I don't know that off the top of my
22 head.
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             THE COURT: You, yourself, put in this -- you know,
24 on page 75 of the brief were very relevant property --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Right.
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THE COURT: -- that's very much an issue here.
 2 \parallel don't know who owns it. You talk about seven transfers.
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   don't know between which entities.
             MR. WOLINSKY: Between and among General Motors
   entities.
             THE COURT: Well, that --
             MR. WOLINSKY: And it's --
             THE COURT: -- that' precisely the point. I mean, do
  you know which one owns it? Do you know which one owns it at
10 the time of the bankruptcy?
             MR. WOLINSKY: Standing here, no, obviously not.
             THE COURT: Do you know which one owned it at the
13 time of the collateral agreement?
             MR. WOLINSKY: Today, I can't say I know that. No,
   Your Honor. And for very good reason. The collateral
   agreement covers that. Collateral agreement is General Motors
|17| -- let's go back in history. Long time ago, this was an
18 agreement between General Motors and the term lenders. The
19 creditors were not -- you know, this group of people were not
20 involved. As between General Motors and the term lenders,
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authority, filed a fixture filing in -- with its full authority

in the relevant counties, and for -- and it -- frankly, it

24 \parallel strikes me as odd that these people who are standing in the

25∥ shoes of General Motors can now say, well, that contract is

21 General Motors represented, warranted, that it had the

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irrelevant and --
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             THE COURT: Well, you read me language from the
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 3 collateral agreement that may or may not be accurate, the
 4 representation. I don't have the --
             MR. WOLINSKY: No, no. It's clearly accurate that
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 6 General Motors, the corporate entity, owned these properties.
 7
   It may own it --
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             THE COURT: Is that clear?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: It may own it --
             THE COURT: That's -- wait a minute, stop.
10
             MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.
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             THE COURT: Okay. You say General Motors owned the
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13 property, but, you know, page 75 of your brief, at least as to
14 \parallel some very important property, suggests there were lots that
15∥ wasn't -- that's not an accurate statement, at least for some
16 of the years.
             MR. WOLINSKY: But it's also the beneficial owner.
17
18\parallel That was also the representation. No doubt that they're the
19 beneficial owner, and no doubt that they have the power to
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   cause their subsidiary to grant a security interest, which is
   what they represented to us that they did.
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             THE COURT: Because their subsidiary -- is there a
23 certificate from the subsidiary that owned the property to
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24 grant a security interest?

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THE COURT: Usually, corporate formalities actually
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   count.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: I don't know the answer to that now.
 4
             THE COURT: They may have had the power to do it, to
 5 cause their subsidiary to do it, but it doesn't mean it was
 6 \parallel done. It doesn't mean that -- if it wasn't done that the
   security interest is effective or not. I don't know.
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   Formalities can make a difference.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor, I don't know the answers
10 to those questions because no one focused on it.
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             THE COURT: What is it that you would like? I
12 thought your --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.
             THE COURT: -- letter was saying since they won't
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15 stipulate, you wanted to take some discovery.
16
             MR. WOLINSKY: No, no. Since they don't stipulate,
   Ms. Charles will be a two-minute witness.
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             THE COURT: Okay.
             MR. WOLINSKY: This is the eFast ledger, this is what
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20 it says, this field means that GM owns the property.
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             THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the eFast ledger
   with you? A relevant page of it?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: No, we don't have it.
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             THE COURT: My concern is if it just says General
25 Motors, that's generic. That doesn't say which General Motors
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entity owned the property. Just says General Motors. Does it
 2 say General Motors for the lease property, too?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: For the lease property?
             THE COURT: Yes.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: I don't know that, Your Honor, off the
 5
 6 top of my head. But again, as to the lease property, we're not
   claiming the security interest in the leased assets, in the
 8
   leased stamping presses because that, by contract, is carved
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   out of the collateral agreement.
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             THE COURT: Yes, but you're --
             MR. WOLINSKY: So that --
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             THE COURT: The CUC exhibits.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: CUC, yes.
             THE COURT: And you're claiming a security interest
14
15 in that.
             MR. WOLINSKY: Yes, because the -- because there,
16
   there was -- GM had the power to grant the security interest
18 \parallel notwithstanding the lease, and we think when you parse it
19 through.
20
             THE COURT: What does the eCast [sic] ledger reflect
   with respect to ownership? I mean, if it just had General
22\parallel Motors next to CUC, what would that -- that would be -- you
23 would have to acknowledge that that's not accurate. They're
24 the lessee. One of the --
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MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.

THE COURT: Some GM entity is the lessee, but not the 1 2 lessor or the owner. 3 MR. WOLINSKY: I can't answer that, you know, standing here. 4 5 THE COURT: Mr. Fisher. MR. FISHER: Your Honor --6 7 THE COURT: You're fine there. You're fine. You can 8 speak from there. 9 MR. FISHER: Just in terms of the eFast question that 10∥ you asked, as Mr. Wolinsky indicated, the eFast ledger is an exhibit. For example, it's Proposed Plaintiff's Exhibit 231. It has a column that refers to ownership, but unfortunately 13 it's not a very helpful --THE COURT: What does it say? 14 15 MR. FISHER: -- data because it -- I don't have it 16 for the specific asset that you asked about, but in general, it describes the ownership by identifying a plant name. $18 \parallel$ doesn't identify a corporate entity. So the plants were not 19 organized themselves as entities. I don't think it's 20 technically correct to say the plant owned the property. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. FISHER: But the point is that this is a fairly large issue about which I think defendants have conceded 24 there's been no discovery, so the idea of having them call 25 in --

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THE COURT: I guess we'll all hear about it at the 2 same time then.

MR. FISHER: Well, but we oppose and continue to oppose the designation of witnesses yesterday on issues about which there's been no discovery to come here and testify.

THE COURT: Would you like to take the witnesses' depositions? It's not a favored -- it wasn't a favored activity of mine when I was a trial lawyer, but I -- more than once, I wound up taking depositions during trial. We're not there yet, so would you like to take the deposition?

MR. FISHER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm going to permit the witness to 13 testify. If you would like to take the deposition, work out with Mr. Wolinsky when you're going to take the deposition.

MR. FISHER: I certainly would like to reserve the 16 right to take the witness's deposition and to continue to talk to Mr. Wolinsky about this issue.

THE COURT: All right. I got hung up on an issue 19 \parallel that maybe turned out to be a non-issue. The bigger question, in my mind, was -- let me turn to the witness list. Pages 50 through 53 of the joint pretrial order, there's a lot of witnesses, some by deposition designation, but --

MR. WOLINSKY: Right.

THE COURT: How many live witnesses do you propose? 25∥Well, the plaintiff has, I think, 20 lives witnesses, and -- 14

or 15 for the plaintiff, although I must say because I'm 2 excluding some of the witnesses that are listed on here were to 3 give parol evidence, which I'm excluding. I'm not going to 4 hear parol evidence. So some of these witnesses are going to 5 come off. But it's a lot of witnesses. Have you -- have the two of you talked about how long you anticipate this trial to last?

MR. WOLINSKY: Your Honor, I think both parties assumed that the trial would consume the full two weeks. Speaking for ourselves, we think it can be done in the two weeks. The written statements make a huge difference, and 12 frankly, the site visit makes a huge difference, things that we 13 might have covered without the site visit, here's the plant, 14 | here's what it does, here's the layout of the plant. We don't need to do that anymore. So really, what the -- what I think the direct testimony is going to wind up on the fixture side is highlights. You know, here are some -- you know, here's something you saw, you may not have noticed this, I'd like to 19 point out the following five things to you.

THE COURT: Yeah, you're making a record. did in the two plants in Michigan is not, you know -- I guess it was -- it's been transcribed if they could hear above the rumble of the machines, but, you know, it wasn't -- but I --24 you know, I appreciated going on the visit. I think I have a better appreciation of some of the equipment and the context,

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1 where it is in the workflow and how large it is and et cetera. 2 I had already looked through the, you know, the picture book, so to speak, before, and you get a much different sense seeing it life.

MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah.

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THE COURT: So I try to have at least six hours of testimony a day. We start at 9. We take one mid-morning break. We obviously break for lunch. We resume generally at two o'clock. Sometimes we adjust the timing a little bit. One 10 afternoon break. And then, you know, it's usually, like, 5:30 when we're stopping for the day. If a witness is -- if we can complete a witness's testimony by working even an hour longer, we'll work an hour longer. I'm not averse to having longer days. It's hard on me. It's hard on you.

I also have -- have the two of you discussed how much 16 notice you're going to give each other about the order of witnesses? I usually ask the lawyers to try and reach an agreement before I impose a requirement. I do -- I think all sides in this case have been entirely professional throughout, and from my standpoint, it's made it a lot easier, and I appreciate that. And I assume that'll continue in trial.

I also am willing to take witnesses out of order. With a lot of witnesses, there's scheduling problems that come What I do insist is I don't -- you need to have your next 25 witness available to go on. Sometimes cross-examination is

shorter than anticipated. I don't like to find we're at three $2 \parallel$ o'clock and you're out of witnesses for the day. I expect you 3 to have witnesses here and ready to go.

I think -- we'll only cover a few more areas, and 5 then I think what I'm going to do is take a very short recess. $6 \parallel \text{I'd}$ like the -- it's more than -- the two of you are sort of the lead, but there's a lot of other lawyers in the courtroom. I don't know how many people are going to be participating in the trial. See, I want you to try and agree on giving each 10∥ other notice of order of witnesses, whether you're -- I don't like to do it every day on taking witnesses out of order, but I do. I mean, in longer trials, it happens, and I'm -- you've got a lot of people coming in from out of town for this, and it creates issues. So I'm certainly willing to try and go along with whatever reasonable agreements the two of you reach. If I have to impose it, I will, but I don't think that's going to happen.

Are you going to use -- am I going to have video, 19 PowerPoint? What -- the courtroom is wired, sort of. say "sort of," under -- near each counsel table, there is a place where you can plug in computers for PowerPoint. displays on the witness screen, my -- one of these two screens, the big screen --

MR. WOLINSKY: Right.

THE COURT: -- that's up there. I think I -- it's

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1 sometimes, I think, quite helpful -- I mean, I still have -- I 2 can't believe how much Lyondell paper is still in here. 3 will be out of here by then, but I still like to have the hard 4 copy to look at, but --

So what's your view, Mr. Wolinsky? Are you going to 6 have -- what electronics are you going to have?

MR. WOLINSKY: We're planning -- we have a trial consultant that will be -- we'll have somebody sitting in the hot seat. He will display documents. We will have hard-copy documents for yourself, as well. We're planning to use the monitors. I don't know whether we're going to bring in another monitor just to make it easier, but this monitor, your monitor, counsel's monitor is the basics that we'll need. And it'll be 14 very helpful for pictures, especially.

THE COURT: Yes. Have you discussed with Mr. Fisher about -- well, I -- after -- you need to talk to our IT people here to make sure that, you know, it's sort of seamless with both of you. Typically, you need to have your IT people come in a day or two before the trial to get everything set up and make sure everything is working properly.

MR. WOLINSKY: I could be wrong. I think they've already been -- I know they've been, and I think they talked to Your Honor's

> My courtroom deputy? THE COURT:

MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah, I think so.

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THE COURT: And the court's IT people are quite good. 2 So there was an issue -- I don't know if it's still an issue -on summary exhibits, and I regularly -- in larger cases, I 4 | frequently have summary exhibits. You know, the Lyondell trial $5\parallel$ was long, and there were summary exhibits and -- and typically, 6 I don't ask to see the backup unless it becomes an issue among the parties, and I don't know whether you've worked out among yourselves to deal with summary issues. I mean, the rules set out it's clearly permissible. I don't know whether you've requested all the backup for any of the summary exhibits, whether you're sharing them in advance, et cetera.

Mr. Fisher.

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MR. FISHER: So, Your Honor, on summary exhibits, we have reached agreement on numerous summary exhibits, and we have disputes as to others. And I think the nature of the dispute is what is a summary exhibit under Rule 1006 because our view is that many of the kinds of exhibits that the 18 defendants are calling summary exhibits are really 19 demonstratives. They are compare-and-contrast-type documents, graphs, efforts to pull data from lots of different sources, not from some single source and summarize it. So that's the basis of our objection, and what we've told them is to the extent that illustrating that kind of information for the Court is important, you can include it in your written direct subject to our objections, but that we don't think that those are th

1 kinds of summary exhibits that come into evidence. If you're 2 \parallel talking about massive spreadsheets and you want to extract it, 3 sum it up, remove columns for ease of reading, all of those $4 \parallel$ kinds of adaptations, we think are helpful to the Court, and 5 we've been able to work out those kinds of issues. 6 where our dispute remains, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So what -- with demonstratives, I mean, 8 ordinarily, they don't come into evidence, but they certainly can in -- usually with that if there's no objection. It's very important to me that the demonstrative show the sources that they list in the ledger and the sources of the information 12 that's included. I don't know whether that will ease your concerns about it. I find them to be quite efficient, you know, when they're done, and I think -- I'm not going to rule 15∥ now whether they can come into evidence or not. You'll make 16 objections what you think. I just -- I urge you to see whether you can, with demonstrative exhibits, assuming that they're given to you sufficiently so you're not surprised when it pops 19 up on the screen, clearly they can use it as a demonstrative, but that hopefully this won't become a major issue along the way.

I mean, you know, they can put the underlying documents in and use the demonstrative for purposes of illustrating and the testimony comes in, but -- I think it'd be 25∥ more of an issue in a jury trial than it is in a bench trial.

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I think I can keep straight what -- you know, what it was, what 2 the source material was. I may have questions, but -- are there other issues, Mr. Fisher, that you had?

MR. FISHER: Well, Your Honor, I -- in terms of how $5\parallel$ much time for the trial and allocation of time, I agree that we $6\parallel$ all would benefit from talking to each other. I also agree that it is absolutely possible, feasible, even realistic to try this case in two weeks, but I do think it takes a fair amount of coordination. And one concern that I have that I'll just flag as something that I think needs to be worked out among the parties is that most of the defendants' case goes in by written direct because most of the witnesses are under their control in some form or another, whereas most of our case is cross and adverse direct. And so in terms of the allocation of time, we 15 need to work that out.

THE COURT: Yeah, it's -- I'll tell you, quite frankly, that's why I didn't do -- what I often do is, in longer cases, is set specific time limits for each side, okay. It seemed to me hard to do here -- for me to do. And so I haven't done that. I'm -- I've got to be careful what I ask for because I might get it. I -- we need to get this trial done -- over and done. You know, if you're moving slow, trial days are going to go until eight or nine o'clock at night. mean, that's the reality. And this -- I've got a docket behind this, and I carved out -- definitely carved out the two weeks,

1 and I say I usually like to get at least six hours a day of 2 testimony, but -- my good friend and former colleague, Arthur 3 Gonzalez, I mean, he regularly had court until nine, ten $4 \parallel$ o'clock at night during trials. I'd prefer not to do that, but $5\parallel$ if we have to do it, we've got to do it. We're going to get 6 this case done.

Let me ask you, have the two of you discussed whether you're going to have a reporter for daily transcript or not?

MR. FISHER: We have, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. FISHER: -- and we plan to do that.

THE COURT: Okay. And, you know, with the latest and 13 greatest of technology, am I going to have an iPad up here 14 that's going to show the live testimony as it's coming in? I'm sure you both know that's not the official transcript, but 16 it's very helpful.

MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor. We've discussed it, $18 \parallel$ and that's something we plan to make available to the Court. 19 Absolutely.

THE COURT: Okay. Any other technology issues that 21 you have on your side?

MR. FISHER: So in terms of technology, I think our 23 plans are similar to the defendants'. We've already 24 coordinated to a certain extent with chambers. I know, though, 25 that it's important to continue to do that.

THE COURT: Right, right. And to make sure that -- I $2 \parallel --$ if it can go wrong, it does go wrong, and so it's really important to make sure before we start the trial, everything is 4 working.

MR. FISHER: Yes. And, Your Honor, in terms of 6 spotting issues, in the pretrial order, there also is another dispute that's reflected about two other witnesses who the defendants have added to their list who've never been identified in discovery before.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. FISHER: I don't know whether that's an issue for 12 today or an issue for --

13 THE COURT: Do you want to take their depositions? MR. FISHER: Well, Your Honor, we don't want them to

15∥be called at all because these are -- the issue as to which they are supposedly going to speak is an issue that the parties have known about for approximately one year.

18 THE COURT: Is the issue reflected in the pretrial 19 order?

MR. FISHER: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FISHER: The witness names are Martin Apfel and Jay Ewing. 23

THE COURT: And what's the -- what issue are they 25 testifying on, do you anticipate?

MR. FISHER: Well, all we've been told is that GM 2 provided information to KPMG, and so we're told that because these two witness names appear on a memo or two memos about which there's been no additional discovery, that they're going to be called to talk about the information that GM supplied to 6 KPMG.

THE COURT: Well, one of the -- I think I have this right, that one of the arguments you made in your motion in limine to exclude the KPMG report was that the GM employees are supplied information upon which KPMG relied were unidentified.

11 Am I -- do I have that right?

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MR. FISHER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And are these supposed to fill that gap?

MR. FISHER: Perhaps, but --

THE COURT: Okay. When would you like to take their deposition?

MR. FISHER: But just to complete, I mean, the --18 just the picture on this, Your Honor, again, this issue of the unreliability of this information was raised a year ago. At Mr. Lakhani's deposition, he's the expert who, you know, of course, relies on this. He said that he has no idea about this benchmarking group, so this is now an effort after discovery, after witness lists closed, to backfill an expert report and 24 try to establish after the fact that what Mr. Lakhani relied 25∥on, you know, has some reliability. We've -- there has been no discovery about this.

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THE COURT: Look, the -- from the very first day that 3 this case got transferred to me from Judge Gerber and you first 4 came in here and Mr. Wolinsky raised the issue of the 5 fresh-start accounting, you were very clear from the start 6 about your -- that you had objection. We can get into the details of all of it, but it was very clear that you objected to it, and you do object and continue to object, and the ruling on the motion in limine, while I'm permitting it, I -- while the order may not reflect it, I've made crystal clear I've got a lot of problems with what they're trying to do, and it may ultimately go to the weight, if any, that's given to it. you wish to take the deposition of these two additional witnesses -- well, additional -- they're on the witness list -arrange with Mr. Wolinsky when the depositions are going to take place. I'm going to clearly take the depositions -- if you want. It's up to you. I assume you'll want to. But --

MR. FISHER: Well --

THE COURT: You know, look, I'm letting it come in, I'm letting the -- for whatever it's worth, Lakhani will testify. The KPMG report will come in. I'm going to let the witnesses -- we'll see when they come in what questions are asked of them, but I'm not going to allow in speculation and hearsay, but if they -- you know, if these are two people who communicated with KPMG information upon which KPMG relied in

1 preparing the fresh-start accounting and it's information of 2 the type that accountants doing fresh-start accounting would typically, you know, gather the information and rely on the information doing it, it's going to come in.

MR. FISHER: Your Honor, just at the risk of 6 belaboring --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. FISHER: -- the point, it's precisely because this exact issue has been front and center in people's minds 10 since January that I think the notion of putting these 11 witnesses on the list the night before the joint pretrial order 12 \parallel is due, long after discovery is closed, is the kind of 13 unfairness that warrant exclusion. I understand this is a 14 | bench trial. I understand that a lot of evidence is going to 15 come in. But this is a situation where the defendants were on 16 full notice for a really long time about this issue, and it's just last-minute efforts to put Band-Aids on it. These 18 witnesses are also outside of New York, so --

THE COURT: I'll tell you what. If they're going to call them as witnesses, they're going to bring them to New York for deposition. Simple as that, okay? That's -- they want them, they'll bring them here for the deposition. I know you're busy in trial prep. I respect that.

And, you know, Mr. Wolinsky, if -- I don't know 25∥ whether you control them or not, but if you're going to --

1 they're not going to testify at trial unless you bring them to 2 New York for deposition.

MR. WOLINSKY: Understood.

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THE COURT: Okay. Other issues?

MR. FISHER: So it's like a punch list before moving 6 in here for two weeks, so closing arguments, Your Honor. You endorsed a letter --

THE COURT: You know, they had the cars off the assembly line. They were doing the punch list items on them and making sure they were all perfect.

MR. FISHER: Right. So closing arguments, you 12 dendorsed a letter to accommodate Mr. Wolinsky's schedule, 13 moving closings to either June 5th, June 6th, or June 7th. When appropriate, I think just everyone would appreciate quidance on which of those three dates will be the closing 16 argument date.

THE COURT: Monday, June 5th. Judicial conference --18 Second Circuit judicial conference starts Wednesday, and I have a trial on Tuesday, so Monday. There's no calendar -- yeah, 20 there is now.

MR. FISHER: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay?

Thank you, Your Honor. MR. FISHER: Yes. 24 know Your Honor had asked about how to deal with confidential 25 information.

THE COURT: Yes. I didn't want to talk about that.

MR. FISHER: So we have --

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THE COURT: I think I signed the stipulation and order. Hope it works.

MR. FISHER: Right. So I think it's Monday when we 6 need to notify all the third parties of exhibits that contain confidential information, and then they have until April 14th to either file a motion or it becomes public, and hopefully that will --

THE COURT: All right. Let me -- one thing I do want 11 \parallel to be clear about, we will not close the courtroom. 12 not -- it will be a public trial. If there are exhibits that 13 have to be maintained as confidential, I expect counsel, in their questioning, to refer to paragraphs or line numbers or whatever you're asking about without -- unless you get clearance from me about disclosing the specific contents. guess we'll have a better sense of it after you see who comes 18 forward with, you know, with requests for confidentiality.

Let me make clear, I did sign that stipulation and order, but I certainly reserve the right to reject confidentiality claims when -- I'll listen to parties if they -- any parties in interest who have questions about specific documents. You know, this -- there was -- in Lyondell, there 24 were a lot of documents that had been designated as 25 \parallel confidential, and when it came time to trial, everything came

in, testimony. You know, the exhibits don't get filed on the 2 docket, so even if they're marked as exhibits and discussed, 3 yes, there's a transcript that's prepared, but people do not 4 | get access to -- public doesn't have access to the exhibits 5 just because they were used at trial. But I believe in public 6 trials, and so that's, you know, let's see where we are.

I think what you ought to do is you need to -- the $8 \parallel$ two of you ought to do a joint status letter after the date, and we'll see what -- how big a problem it is, okay? It's already unusual, and I haven't made -- so many of the briefs that were filed in connection with the motions in limine are under seal, and usually I require redaction. We didn't go 13 through that. It was just too much to do. So we'll see.

MR. FISHER: Okay. And, Your Honor, we will shortly be replacing your Lyondell binders with binders for this case. In preparing the joint pretrial order, which was an extraordinarily challenging, but also collaborative effort, I 18∥ think both sides have discovered mistakes in the exhibit list and in documents, and so we're just trying to work those all 20 out.

THE COURT: I'm sure -- look, you're going to get 22∥ into trial and you're going to discover mistakes, and you're going to work them out. So typically, what -- with -- it's not that I've had that many long trials here, but certainly this recent experience with the Lyondell case, what I asked the

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1 lawyers to do, and they did it very well, was at the end of $2 \parallel$ each witness, they would review the exhibits that had been 3 admitted in -- you know, they kept -- basically, they kept the $4 \parallel \text{list} -- \text{you can talk to my law clerk, she can see what they}$ $5 \parallel$ did. So I would get, every day or every other day depending 6 on, you know, the witnesses -- I think there were only -- it's just a couple of exhibits that there was some disagreement about, but -- and so what I -- and those -- I would enter an order with just the exhibit numbers on it to show that they 10 were admitted in evidence. And if objections were -deposition designations, there were just -- there were orders that went through each of the deposition designations as to which there were objections, and it showed sustained, and I, you know, overruled or whatever. I think -- it worked pretty well there.

So talk to my law clerk. She can see what they did. That worked pretty well. Yes, I keep notes and I try to keep 18 track of that exhibit is marked -- well, they're all marked for 19 dentification already, but what exhibits have been -- what I don't want is just get to the end of the case and just say, we agree that all of these exhibits, these 25 pages of exhibits come in. If you don't use it, it's -- you know, it's not coming in, okay? Because I do review all the exhibits that are in evidence, and so -- it's the same way with the depositions. I don't allow entire deposition transcripts to get dumped in.

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We'll -- you know, I don't know whether you've collaborated to
 2 mark -- color-code deposition transcripts. That works well,
 3 \parallel you know, to show the objections and try to rule on them and --
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             MR. FISHER: We have done that. We have done that,
 5 Your Honor.
             THE COURT:
                        Okay. That's very helpful for me.
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   appreciate that.
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             MR. FISHER: And again, that was a very -- extremely
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   collaborative --
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             THE COURT: Yes.
             MR. FISHER: -- effort. I think the last issue on my
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12\parallel list is, assuming we all make it through the trial, we may --
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             THE COURT: Thanks a lot.
             MR. FISHER: Speaking about my own level of
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   exhaustion, I suppose. We --
             THE COURT: I came back from Michigan with a cold,
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   so --
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             MR. FISHER: I'm very sorry to hear that.
                                                        We have
19 been making, I think, good progress in thinking about what a
20 mediation would look like after Your Honor renders the decision
   on the 40 representative assets, and I just wanted to report on
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   that very generally. It's still in development.
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                         You know, I look around my office, and I
             THE COURT:
24 have about five boxes with expert reports and motions in limine
25∥ on 40 assets. If you want to do this on another 199,960,
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1 you'll spend the rest of your life doing it. And you're a lot 2 younger than I am, so --3 MR. FISHER: I think I've nothing further, Your 4 Honor. 5 Mr. Wolinsky, anything else you want to THE COURT: 6 raise? 7 MR. WOLINSKY: No, Your Honor, we're set. 8 THE COURT: Let me -- I do want to ask this. 9 many lawyers are going to be questioning witnesses because their -- term lenders have lawyers, as well. 11 MR. WOLINSKY: Yeah. No, Your Honor, actually one of 12 the things I did want to do was introduce the people who are 13 going to be handling witnesses at the trial. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. WOLINSKY: Chris Szczerban is going to be 16 participating in the trial. Carrie Reilly will be participating in the trial. 18 THE COURT: These your colleagues? 19 MR. WOLINSKY: Yes. Mr. Callagie (phonetic) is my 20 closest colleague. 21 THE COURT: Yes, I know. 22 MR. WOLINSKY: Lee Wilson will be presenting 23 witnesses. 24 Okay. THE COURT: 25 MR. WOLINSKY: And Emil Kleinhaus, I think you know

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1 will be presenting witnesses.
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             THE COURT: I do, okay.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: And I'll stand up every once in a
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  while, too.
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             THE COURT: Are the term lenders going to have
 6 counsel actively participating in the trial?
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Mr. Bennett, who you know couldn't be
 8 here today will be participating in the trial.
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             THE COURT: I don't know, I may exclude him because
10 he's not here today.
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             MR. WOLINSKY: He will be. And I don't know,
12 Mr. Shumaker is here, who is going to be prepared to speak if
13 --
                        Mr. Shumaker, you are from what firm?
14
             THE COURT:
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             MR. SHUMAKER: I'm with Jones Day, Your Honor. I'm
16 Mr. Bennett's partner.
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             THE COURT: Okay. All right.
             MR. SHUMAKER: And my other partner, Erin Burke, may
18
19 also be presenting witness.
             THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.
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             Any -- Mr. Wolinsky, anticipate -- is anybody from
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   Munger Tolles going to be participating or -- I'm just --
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             MR. WOLINSKY: Just joking, right? No, we're --
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             THE COURT: I don't know, you know. They've been
25 showing up at hearings, but --
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MR. WOLINSKY: We have a very warm relationship with 2 Munger Tolles. Sometimes it's heated, sometimes it's collaborative. But their role in life is to --3 THE COURT: Make your life difficult? MR. WOLINSKY: -- pursue the cross-claims. THE COURT: Okay. MR. WOLINSKY: And our hope is they never get -- they 8 never have to be pursued, but we'll see. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Fisher, how many lawyers do you anticipate are 11 going to be participate? MR. FISHER: Your Honor, it will be some combination 13 of the five of us, my partner, Neil Binder, Lauren Handelsmen, 14 Tessa Harvey, and Lindsey Bush. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Take it for what it's 16 worth. I really appreciate when you get young lawyers or associates having a standup role during a trial. They're not 18 going to handle the biggest witnesses, but you can do what you

you know, sometimes lawyers are afraid of having too many

lawyers show up in court and do different -- have different

19 wish with it, but I'm much nicer to young associates than I am

to the partners. So let me just end with that. You should --

speaking roles. Particularly, if the too many are young

lawyers, I don't mind at all. So you'll just do as you -- you

25∥know, you shouldn't feel that, you know, you can't bring any

1 more -- they may not be here for the whole trial, but they may 2 come in to argue certain things or handle non-controversial 3 witnesses or controversial witnesses, you know. I've got some 4 really fine young lawyers who've appeared before me and done 5 things, so I just say that for your -- because this is a long 6 trial.

Okay. All right. If there are other issues that 8 come up that you want to address formally or informally, call my chambers and -- because it's a big case, I usually have any 10 \parallel telephone hearings that I've done on the record. I don't necessarily do that in all trials, but you'll -- you can talk 12 to my law clerks and we're usually pretty accommodating in getting things set up quickly. Okay? I look forward to seeing you all.

MR. FISHER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: For those who are observing a holiday starting on Monday night, have a good holiday.

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you, Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Proceedings concluded at 11:34 a.m.)

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CERTIFICATION

I, Alicia Jarrett, court-approved transcriber, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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ALICIA JARRETT, AAERT NO. 428

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DATE: April 10, 2017

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